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 ABSTRACT  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of nodes that can be rapidly deployed as a multi-hop 
network without the aid of any centralized administration. Misbehavior is challenged by bandwidth and 
energy efficient medium access control and fair share of throughput. Node misbehavior plays an important 
role in MANET. In this survey, few of the contention window misbehavior is reviewed and compared. The 
contention window cheating either minimizes the active communication of the network or reduces 
bandwidth utilization of a particular node. The classification presented is in no case unique but summarizes 
the chief characteristics of many published proposals for contention window cheating. After getting insight 
into the different contention window misbehavior, few of the enhancements that can be done to improve the 
existing contention window are suggested. The purpose of this paper is to facilitate the research efforts in 
combining the existing solutions to offer more efficient methods to reduce contention window cheating 
mechanisms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) [22] has recently been the topic of extensive research. The 
interest in such network stems from their ability to provide temporary and instant wireless 
networking solutions. MANET consumes huge amount of power and bandwidth and undergoes 
frequent topology changes [20], [21]. MANET is a self-organizing multi-hop wireless network 
with no predefined infrastructure. The self-organizing features of rapid deployment make 
MANET very attractive in military and earth quakes where fixed infrastructure no available [22]. 
In mobile Ad hoc networks all the nodes have to cooperate to ensure successful communication. 
An individual node stops cooperating in order to increase its gains such as higher throughput or 
extended battery life. Such nodes are called selfish or misbehaving nodes. A selfish node may 
obtain an unfair throughput share by not obeying the (Medium Access Control) MAC 
mechanism. Such benefits can be obtained by selecting small backoff, not doubling the 
Contention Window (CW), changing default interframe times and manipulating Network 
Allocation Vector (NAV) etc. Protocol misbehaviors have been studied in various scenarios in 
different communication layers and under several mathematical frameworks. Most notably, a 
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heuristic set of conditions is proposed in [1] for testing the extent to which MAC protocol 
parameters have been manipulated. 
A selfish node [2], [3] affects the network operation specifically by the proper selection of 
backoff intervals but refuse to forward data packets. Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be 
launched against any layer in the network protocol stack. Malicious nodes can advertise incorrect 
routing updates in the network or drop all the packets passing through them. This type of attack is 
called Denial of Service Attack.  Selfish node in the MAC layer will try to maximize its own 
throughput and keep the channel busy. As a side effect of this behavior, legitimate nodes cannot 
use the channel for transmission. 
An attacker may exploit this feature by asserting large duration field, thereby preventing well 
behaved clients from gaining access to the channel. This type of attack is called Network 
Allocation Vector (NAV) attack. A malicious node aims primarily to disrupt the normal operation 
of the network. These nodes continuously send data to each other in order to deplete the channel 
capacity in their vicinity and hence prevent other legitimate users from communicating [4]. A host 
exploits this vulnerability and completely cooperates in forwarding data packets but maliciously 
forces the forwarding operation to fail. This attack mainly targets the route discovery process in 
order to route the packets through longer routes. The attack also targets flows that traverse 
through a malicious node, thus forcing the routing protocol to reroute packets around the 
misbehaving node [5]. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
Sundaramurthy and Royer suggest the Asymmetric key Distribution-Mixnets (AD-MIX) [6] 
protocol to discourage selfishness by nodes in terms of forwarding data packets. Concealing the 
true destination of a packet from intermediate nodes encourages data forwarding. This forces a 
node to participate or risk dropping packets that may be destined for the node itself [17]. 
Incentive compatible medium access control   ICMAC [7] is a Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) based MAC protocol that is resilent to contention window misbehavior. Through a 
game theoretic approach and the use of the Vickrey auction mechanism, the authors provide 
incentives for the nodes to cooperate. The TDMA nature of this protocol makes it more 
complicated to use in ad-hoc environments [12]. 
In minimax detection [8] framework is employed to analyze the instance of theoretical worst-case 
attacks. This approach is more robust but no operational method is used to detect misbehavior. 
Only the successful transmissions are observable, and in the event of collision, it is not possible to 
determine what terminals were involved in it [13]. 
A new type of vulnerability was presented by Guang and Assi [9] where a host maliciously 
modify the protocol timeout mechanism by changing SIFS (Short Inter Frame Space) parameter 
in 802.11 and cause MAC frames to be dropped at well-behaved nodes [11].  
M. Raya, J. P. Hubaux, and I. Aad [10] presented a detection system called DOMINO that does 
not require any modifications to the MAC protocol and they presented several procedures for 
detecting misbehaviors that aim at altering protocol parameters such as shorter than Distributed 
Inter frame Space (DIFS), oversized NAV, and  backoff  manipulation. The system is 
implemented at Access Point (AP) and the AP is assumed to be trusted. Traffic traces of sending 
hosts are collected periodically during short intervals of time called monitoring periods. Collected 
data is then passed to the DOMINO algorithm. When a node misbehaves its corresponding cheat 
counter exceeds a certain threshold [14]. 
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3. Techniques Proposed For Detecting Selfishness in MANET 
3.1. DREAM - Detection and REAction Timeout MAC Layer Misbehavior   
Lei Guang et al [11] proposed a new type of malicious behavior TimeOut (TO) attack and 
provided the corresponding detection and reaction schemes. Rather than just correctly identifying 
the misbehaved nodes, they developed a two stage reaction mechanism when the first reaction 
stage is to mitigate and second reaction stage is to punish It improves the network performance in 
the presence of well behaved nodes. Detection schemes should be implemented for a receiver and 
a transmitter. DREAM system considers being a network that can be either working in an ad hoc 
or infrastructure mode. Figure 1 shows the detection and first reaction of DREAM method. It 
considers two types of misbehaved node. 
1) misbehaved node that has no knowledge of the DREAM. 










Figure1. Detection and first reaction 
Misbehaving nodes are carried through one TO attack. Detection function can be carried out in 
three steps for misbehaved transmitter and misbehaved receiver. 
Receiver node R may receive subsequent Request To Send (RTS) during the data timeout, default 
timeout of the DATA frame (TODATA  ) or after the timeout. Node R also maintains a parameter 
called badCredit to evaluate the trustworthiness of every node. When the second RTS arrives at 
node R during TODATA, it is more likely that node M is misbehaving, R will punish node M by 
increasing its badCredit parameter heavily.  
The adjustment scheme is used to ensure correct misbehavior diagnosis by node R. Once node M 
is designated as a suspect, then node R will react by expediting the transmission of the Clear To 
Send (CTS) frame. Node M is not reliable for any future communication. At this point, the trust 
level of node M is reduced by node R. This monitoring and reacting process continues for a 
pre-set monitoring period until the trust level of node M falls below a trust level threshold and 
node R invokes its second reaction scheme. 
A node will be marked as a suspect when its badCredit is above a predetermined credit Threshold 
during a short term monitoring period. Once node is identified as s Suspect Node (SN), the system 
needs to determine whether the SN is an Untrused (UN) or Trusted Node (TN). For this reason, a 
long term monitoring is triggered during which the trust level of every SN will be evaluated based 
on its cooperation. Every time the SN misbehaves, its trust level is reduced and a trust threshold is 
defined below which the SN is considered as an UN. Based on the different value of trust level, a 
well-behaved node (WN) can invoke corresponding punishment methods. Correct detection ratio 
is 100% and misdetection ratio is 20%. In the first reaction scheme there is a slight decrement 
TO_CTS
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compared with normal case. In the second reaction scheme network delivery ratio increases. 
Average delay is less compared with the normal case. 
3.2.  Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA)  
Szymon et al [12] proposed the impact of contention window misbehavior on single hop ad-hoc 
networks. Uplink and down link traffics were simulated. Throughput, delay, fairness was 
considered for Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP).  In this 
paper author proposed a new distributed channel access mechanism called EDCA. It separates 
traffic into four access categories (AC) of different priority. Each category has its own set of 
parameters. Arbitration Inter Frame Space (AIFS), Transmission Opportunity (TXOP), CWmin, 
CWmax. These parameters are responsible for traffic differentiation.  
Figure 2 shows the channel access prioritization of EDCA method similar to 802.11 DCF. AIFS 
[AC] is a parameter which replaces the DIFS of Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). An 
internal virtual collision mechanism is used to determine which frame can be sent. The potential 
benefits of misbehaving nodes are measured for UDP/TCP  traffic in both uplink and downlink 
directions. 
                                 
            





Figure 2. Channel access prioritization 
In the uplink scenario, the good nodes had unaltered contention window parameters: CWmin=31, 
CWmax=1023. The bad node had these parameters significantly decreased: CWmin=1, CWmax=5. In 
the downlink scenario, the bad node sends TCP-ACK packets. Therefore, two TCP flows, with an 
offered load of 8Mbits/s each, were used to put the network in a state of saturation. The bad node 
increases its throughput until saturation is achieved. 
The main conclusion is that CW misbehavior leads to severe unfairness in the uplink direction. 
The misbehaving node can dominate uplink traffic in terms of both throughput and delay. 
Misbehaving nodes increasing its throughput is higher for UDP than TCP and more significant for 
smaller network sizes. A disadvantage of this method is that it gives higher throughput only in the 
smaller network sizes. 
3.3.  Kolmogorov-Smirov (K-S) Test 
Alberto Lopez Toledo and Xiaodong Wang [13] developed nonparametric batch and sequential 
detectors based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistics that do not require any modification 
on the existing Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocols. 
The performance of proposed detectors was compared with the optimum detectors with perfect 
information about the misbehavior strategy for both the batch case and sequential case. Detection 
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To detect a misbehaving node observing the sequence of operation in the network. Authors have 
proposed two hypotheses H0   and H1. H0 corresponds to the observed terminal not misbehaving. 
H1 corresponds to the terminal misbehaving. f0 and f1 are the probability distributions of the 
observations when a node is not misbehaving and misbehaving respectively. If the misbehavior is 
detected, the observer terminals have a mechanism to inform the rest of the network. The 
sequence of backoff intervals is selected by a terminal. Successful transmissions can be calculated 
using the number of idle slots between two consecutive transmissions. The number of idle slots 
can be calculated as X
 i = ti – ti-1– TDIFS – To/σ, i>1, where TDIFS is the duration of the DIFS frame, 
σ is the duration of an idle slot, and To is the duration of transmissions from other terminals and 
collisions, including their interframe time 
3.3.2. Probability Distribution of Legitimate Terminals 
Let pc be the probability of collision, U denotes the uniform probability distribution. 
Transmission will be successful with probability (1 − pc). If there is a collision, with probability 
pc, then the terminal would double its window size and make another attempt after T2 ∼ U[0, 64] 
slots. If the last transmission is successful then the number of idle slots after the last successful 
transmission is xi = T1 + T2 ∼ U[0, 32] + U[0, 64] with probability pc(1− pc). From the above 
argument one can easily obtain the distribution of the number of idle slots between successful 
transmissions. In order to characterize and quantify misbehavior, compare f1 to the strategy of a 
saturating legitimate node f0. . If the terminal is not saturating, its cumulative distribution 
functions (cdf) satisfies F1(x) < F0(x), ∀x.  If the cdf of a terminal is always on or below the cdf of 
a well behaved terminal that is always transmitting, then the terminal is definitely not 
misbehaving. 
To obtain Collision Probability Estimation, the distribution  f0 of the idle slots between successful 
transmissions for saturating legitimate terminal and the probability of collision in the network pc 
has to be estimated. A terminal can keep track of its own transmissions and count how many of 
them resulted in collisions. The K-S test determines whether the underlying distribution f1 differs 
from a hypothesized distribution  f0. The K-S test compares the cdf F1 obtained from the data 
samples with the hypothesized cdf  F0, and determines whether F1 = F0, or F1 < F0, or F1 > F0. For 
the misbehavior detection problem, define the null hypothesis as the event where a node is not 
misbehaving. Choose H0 : F1 ≤ F0 (not misbehaving), H1 : F1 > F0 (misbehaving). 
3.3.3. N-trunked sequential test 
Using the N- trunked sequential test fix the desired false alarm probability of the sequential test to 
PFA = α. Because the sequential test is composed of N tests, we need to calculate the false alarm 
probability of each stage in order to meet the overall PFA . 
The K-S detector is able to detect the misbehaviors very fast, requiring less than twice the samples 
needed by the optimum detector with perfect information. Performance of the K-S detector starts 
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Figure 3.  Predictable Random Backoff 
3.4.  PREDICTABLE RANDOM BACKOFF  (PRB) 
Lei Guang and Chadi Assi [14] proposed Predictable Random Backoff (PRB) algorithm based on 
modifications of IEEE 802.11 Binary Exponential Backoff (BEB) and forces each node to 
generate predictable random backoff intervals. Based on PRB, selfish node applies two 
consequences to manipulate the selection of CW. If the selfish node follows PRB, the negative 
impact will be mitigated regardless of attack strategies. If the selfish node does not follow PRB, 
the backoff selection is predictable; the receiver can easily detect the misbehavior of the receiver 
with direct evidence and perform immediate punishment. Figure 3 shows that the CW continues 
to increase until it reaches CWMAX. 
Receiver is used to detect a selfish misbehavior.  A Rx can compute actual backoff (Biact) for each 
received frame. If Biact< Bilb labelled as misbehaved Tx where B ilb is the lower bound backoff 
computed based on CWilb. The value of CWilb is deterministic and can be easily calculated by the 
Rx through monitoring the transmissions of Tx. If the selfish node selects larger CW the detection 
can be mitigated by using Biact  > Biub .  The Author compared the performance of BEB and PRB 
based on no attack and attack case. The fairness index of PRB ensures a much better fair share of 
the channel bandwidth when the traffic load becomes higher. In PRB the throughput of the selfish 
flow has decreased 74%. Each well behaved flow has increased nearly 170%. Compared to BEB, 
PRB gives higher throughput. PRB achieves better performance than BEB especially in a 
congested environment. The main drawback of this method is that the attack requires 
manipulating CW only once and it can intentially choose CW between Blb and Bub. 
3.5. EIED Backoff Algorithm 
Nah-Oak Song et al [15] proposed algorithm called Exponential Increase Exponential Decrease 
(EIED) which is significantly improving the network performance over BEB.  In Multiple 
Increase Linear Decrease (MILD), the contention window size is multiplied by 1.5 on a collision 
but decreased by 1 on a successful transmission. MILD performs well when the network load is 
steadily heavy. It does not perform well when the network load is light. In EIED, whenever a 
packet transmitted from a node is involved in a collision, the contention window size for the node 
is increased by backoff  factor rI , and the contention window for the node is decreased by backoff 
factor rD if the node transmits a packet successfully. rI = rD =2 was presented in [16]. The EIED 
backoff algorithm can be represented as follows. 
CW=min [rI.CW, CWmax] on a collision, 
CW=max [CW/rD, CWmin] on a success.  
BEB and MILD are compared with four different cases of EIED. The four cases of EIED always 
give higher throughput than BEB. The delay performance of MILD is poor when the number of 
nodes is small. EIED works well specially in a congested environment. 
    0:31 cw_lb(1):31 cw_lb(1):63  cw_lb(1):511 CW_lb(1):1023 
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3.5. Deterministic and Statistical Method 
Venkata Nishanth Lolla et al [17] proposed a combination of deterministic and statistical methods 
that allow nodes to discern violations of backoff timers by neighboring nodes. First the nodes are 
exchange the state of their pseudo random number generators with their neighbors. In certain 
scenarios, a node may not be able to accurately monitor the backoff countdown of a neighbor. In 
order to compute the expected backoff time, use a statistical online estimation. The tagged node 
announces the state of its pseudo-random sequence generator using which the monitoring 
neighbor can determine the sequence of backoff times to be used by tagged node. 
The monitoring neighbor may not be able to deterministically determine if the tagged node is 
using a legitimate backoff countdown process. In such cases, the observed backoff times would 
differ from what the monitoring node computes using the announced pseudo random sequence 
generator state. The monitoring neighbor then uses a hypothesis test based on its online estimates 
of the probabilities PI/B and PB/I to determine if the difference between the observed and expected 
backoff times is sufficient to deem the tagged node as a misbehaving node.  
On line estimation of the system state described by the traffic intensity (p) experienced by a 
monitoring node is computed based on the number of busy/idle slots observed on the terminal. All 
nodes use a sequence of backoff timers generated by a pseudo-random number generator 
(PRNG). The nodes are required to provide their respective MAC addresses as the seed to the 
PRNG. 





















                                                 MAC   Header 
 
Figure 4. Modified packet structure for RTS. 
As shown in Figure 4, every RTS packet sent by the sender S will have the sequence offset 
number (seqoff#) and an attempt number (Attempt#) included in a new field introduced in the 
packet. The sender uses ‘attempt number’ for handling packet retransmissions. It is set to one 
after every successful transmission by the sender and is incremented by one after every 
unsuccessful attempt. The sender does not cheat on attempt number .A Message Digest (MD) of 
the corresponding DATA packet is computed using a hash functions MD5 which is attached as a 
new field in the RTS packet. During retransmissions, if the receiver notices that a MD for a 
particular DATA packet matches for multiple retransmissions and the attempt number does not 
increase with successively received transmissions, the sender is deemed to be misbehaving.               
This scheme detects misbehaves by reducing its computed backoff to approximately 75% of the 
dictated time. The accuracy improves considerably and the misdiagnosis probability reduces. The 
advantage of this approach is viable even if the load in the network were to be varied. 
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3.6.  Hop-by-hop Efficient Authentication Protocol (HEAP) 
Rehan Akbani et al [18] proposed a hop-by-hop efficient authentication protocol called HEAP. 
HEAP authenticates packets at every hop by using modified MAC-based algorithm along with 
two keys. Every node shares a pair-wise secret hash key, called okey, with each of its neighbors 
and generates one common secret hash key called okey and securely distributes it to its entire one 
hop neighbors. A node generates a new Hash Functions for Message Authentication (HMAC) for 
every individual neighbor using its okey. 
HMAC is computed as HMAC (M,K) = H(K x opad|H (K × ipad|M)). Packet index numbers are 
included in the packet to protect against message replays. HEAP latency is very low compared to 
TELSA, LHAP and Lu. It provides significant effect on throughput and delivery ratio. Memory 
requirements are also very less. HEAP is resistant to several outsider attacks such as DoS, 
wormhole, replay, impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks by making it very difficult for an 
outsider to propagate any forged packet.  
3.7. Trust Vector DSR (TVDSR) 
Wei Gong et al [19] proposed to use trust vector model based routing protocols. The author 
proposed an efficacy mechanism which is based on trust evaluation. Each node would evaluate its 
own trust vector parameters about neighbors through monitoring neighbor’s pattern of traffic in 
network. Then evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism by modifying Dynamic 
Source Routing (DSR), so that each node has a dynamic changing trust vector for its neighbor’s 
behaviors. This vector can be normalized into a single trust value that has been provided as 
evidence for decision making in routing selection process. 
Trust vector of node A to B is  
                V (A → B) = [AEB, AKB, ARB]  
Where AEB,  AKB  and  ARB are node A’s evaluation of experience, knowledge and recommendation 
to node B. The normalization of trust vector can be defined as                                                       
| V (A→B) |=ATB. 
({AEB, AKB, ARB} ϵ [0, 1], {WE, WK, WR} ϵ [0, 1]) where WA is node a A’s trust policy vector,  
ATB  is a single trust value of node A on node B corresponding to the normalized trust vector. 
AEB is node A’s evaluation on node B by directly monitoring packet communication of node B. 
Using (1),
      AEB can be computed by node A : 
       AEB =                            (1)                    
Where is the number of packets node B had actually forwarded. PB is the number of all packets 
responsible for forwarding.  is all out-coming packets,  is all incoming packets from node 
B.  is packets from source node B to destination node A.  packet come from source node 
A to destination B. 
 
       AKB is node A’s evaluation to node B by directly observing MAC layer link quality between 
node A and node B on physical layer. Computation formula is as follows: 
                     AKB = (1-PA,B)*(1-PB,A)   
Where, PA,B  is  packet loss probability from node A to node B, while PB,A is packet loss 
probability from node B to node A. 
ARB is node A’s evaluation to node B by collecting recommendations about node B from other 
nodes which should be the neighbor node B. This is given y the equation:
    
        ARB =                        
The time dependent is defined as:  
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 be the trust value of node A to node B at time and  be the decayed value of 
the same at  time .  =  -  and k is an integer greater than are equal to 1.Compared to DSR, 
TVDSR gives higher packet delivery ratio and also reduce the malicious nodes dramatically. 
4. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISION 
Detecting MAC layer misbehavior is a broad area of research that is based on the 
contention-window MAC protocols. 
The contention window cheating is done based on the following metrics. 
 Correct detection: It is defined as the ratio of the number of misbehaved nodes that are 
correctly   marked by the detection system as suspects to the total number of active 
misbehaved nodes in the network. 
 Misdetection: It is defined as the ratio of the number of well behaved nodes that are incorrectly 
diagnosed as suspects to the total number of well behaved nodes in the network. 
 Packet delivery ratio: It is the ratio of the data packets successfully delivered to the destination 
to those generated by the source. 
 Delay: It is the average delay time of all successfully delivered packets. 
 Throughput: It is the ratio of the data packets successfully delivered to the destination for each 
flow to those generated by the source. 
Table 1 gives the comparisons of few of the contention window cheating techniques. 
Misbehaving nodes always choose smaller backoff values for more bandwidth utilization. A 
combination of contention window misbehaviors along with the adjustment scheme is used to 
ensure correct misbehavior diagnostics. In DREAM [11] two reaction schemes require minor 
changes of the existing standard to mitigate the protocol failure or the misuse. The DREAM 
method is invoked a modified timeout period based on the detection threshold. 
Table 1.  Comparison of Techniques proposed for detecting selfishness in MANET 
 
Alberto and Xiaodong [13] developed nonparametric batch and sequential detectors based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirov (K-S) statistics that do not require any modification on the existing Sense 






DREAM Very good Good Very good Good Good 
EDCA Good Good High in TCP High   in UDP   High in   TCP 
KOLMOGOROV- 
SMIROV(K-S) TEST 
Very good Good Good Bad Good 
PREDICTABLE 
RANDOM BACKOFF
Good Good Good Good Very good 
EIED BACKOFF 
ALGORITHM 














HEAP Good Good Very good Bad Very good 
TVDSR Good Good Very Good Bad Good 
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which the number of competing terminal is changing. Lei and Chadi evaluate the efficiency of the 
PRB algorithm in mitigating the negative effects of MAC layer selfish misbehavior. DREAM 
method performs better than any other method. PRB gives higher throughput especially in 
congested environment. HEAP and TVDSR methods give better delivery ratio compared to any 
other method. Although the results in the consulted papers always show an improvement of the 
misbehavior detection, they never considered the correct detection method because they are 
usually compared with the proposals that do not consider all the metrics. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The recent research efforts have made a lot of progress on contention window cheating 
misbehavior in MANET. Detecting MAC layer misbehavior is one of the main issues in MANET. 
In this paper, a comprehensive survey of contention window cheating techniques in MANET that 
has been presented in the literature. These cheating techniques are modifications of the contention 
window parameters like backoff time, network allocation vector and SIFS parameters etc. They 
have a common objective of trying to utilize more bandwidth, reduce the battery power at each 
node. In many cases it is difficult to compare them directly since each method has a different goal 
with different assumptions and employs different means to achieve the goal. 
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